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Mother, n. 1.a. The female parent of a human being; a woman
in relation to a child or children to whom she has given
birth . . . - OED
1
Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond
of love the mother has for her child . . . It is self-evident that a
mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must struggle
with grief . . . - Gonzales v. Carhart, (Kennedy, J.)2
Why does the Supreme Court refer to the woman who is seeking an
abortion as "mother"? Surely the definition has not escaped the attention of
a Court that frequently relies on the dictionary to define important terms or
* Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. I wish
to thank Leslie Baze, Brienne Carprenter, and Katherine Johnson for their excellent
research assistance. I also wish to thank the participants in the workshop, "Engaging
Tradition and Stigma: Divergent Trends in Reproductive and Sexual Rights," held at
Columbia Law School, May, 2012.
1. Mother Definition, OxFoRD ENGLISH DicrioNARY, http://www.oed.com (last vis-
ited Sept. 11, 2012).
2. 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007).
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principles.3 And why does the Court choose to describe the fetus as a child?
What message does this language send about abortion and the woman who
seeks an abortion?
The Court's abortion decisions embody an ongoing debate on the le-
gitimacy of constitutional protection of the right to choose. This debate
unfolds most obviously as a discourse on constitutional interpretation; dis-
agreements within the Court are reflected in the language of constitutional
principles and standards. This debate also plays out, hidden in plain view,
in the vocabulary used by the Court to describe the woman who stands at
the center of the constitutional controversy and the life within her.
The Court's abortion jurisprudence, which began with an unequivocal
articulation of the right to choose as a fundamental right, has devolved into
a patchwork of decisions reflecting ambivalence about a woman's right to
choose or clear efforts to de-constitutionalize the right. Not surprisingly, the
rhetoric that emerges in the opinions often tracks the discord within the
Court. The woman whose dignity and equality depend upon reproductive
self-determination appears in conjunction with a strong articulation or affir-
mation of the right to choose. By contrast, the woman often is missing from
decisions diluting the right to choose; if she appears it will be in the role of
passive patient, mother, or mere body part. Often, the Court's nomencla-
ture for developing life corresponds to its description of the woman, with
the pairing of mother and child most evident in decisions hostile to the
right to choose.
The abortion opinions reveal multiple, and conflicting, narratives
about the status and dignity of both the woman and the developing life. For
the woman, at least some of these narratives reflect stereotypes about
women's judgment and morality. The narratives themselves often are at
odds with what the Court actually does, as in Planned Parenthood ofSouth-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,4 where the Court coupled a robust description
of the significance of the right to choose with a constitutional standard that
diminished the very self-determination and equality exalted by the Court.
The vocabulary in the Court's abortion jurisprudence displays an
ongoing, and increasing, politicizing of the discord within the Court. What
began in Roe as a potpourri of references to woman, mother, fetus, and child
has morphed into a careful and fairly predictable construction of vocabulary
that reflects the polarization of opinion. For example, in Roe, the majority
3. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999) (using two
dictionary definitions of "substantially" to deny rights under the ADA), superseded by
statute, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
159-60 (1973) (using DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY to define
the stages of growth of a fetus and viability).
4. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852-54, 868-69 (1992).
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opinion by Justice Blackmun used the term "woman" slightly more fre-
quently than the term "mother."5 In Casey, the joint opinion used the term
woman over one hundred times. 6 "Mother" was named only nine times,
three of which involved quotations from earlier opinions.7 Although the use
of the terms "woman" and "mother" are often key to the Court's construc-
tion of the abortion debate, these terms are only part of the broader vocabu-
lary employed by the Court to describe the issues and interests at stake. The
narratives constructed through this vocabulary reveal more than constitu-
tional principles; they disclose how the Court identifies and assesses the
social values at the heart of the abortion controversy. The language used by
the Court thus becomes part of the social discourse, a high profile, highly
public commentary that becomes the foundation for further political strat-
egy and action.
Abortion stigma is a social construct, generated through political and
legal discourse. The recent explosion of anti-choice legislation in Congress
and state legislatures is a strong indicator of the increasing stigmatization of
abortion. These measures can readily be characterized as an assault on the
moral authority of women. Laws mandating invasive ultrasounds, biased
counseling sessions, and onerous waiting periods, along with fetal "per-
sonhood" and fetal pain laws, are intended to shame and punish women
who seek abortions.
The opinions of the Court, beginning with Roe, mediate abortion
stigma through both language and legal standards. The Court's framing of
the abortion procedure, of the woman and physician, and of prenatal life
has contributed to the ascendancy of abortion stigma. Casey, in particular,
marks a turning point, where the Court's overt expression of moral disgust
with abortion correlates with diminished constitutional protection.
This article examines how the abortion decisions contribute to abor-
tion stigma. It argues that several narratives emerge from the vocabulary
deployed by the Court to describe both the woman who seeks an abortion
and prenatal life. These narratives serve a potent expressive function. Most
display considerable ambivalence about the moral authority of women, par-
ticularly women who decide, even temporarily, not to become mothers.
From Roe onward, the Court has reinforced abortion stigma through dis-
course as well as constitutional standards. This stigma marginalizes both the
abortion procedure and the woman who seeks an abortion. This marginal-
5. The opinion referred to "woman" thirty-eight times and "mother" twenty-six times.
Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
6. Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
7. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879, 912 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-65).
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ization, in turn, provides justification for increasing restrictions on a
woman's access to abortion.
Part I considers the significance of the language used by the Court in
the generation of abortion stigma. Part II examines the narratives con-
structed by the Court concerning the woman who may seek an abortion.
The focus primarily is on three key abortion cases, Roe, Casey, and Gonzales
v. Carhart (Carhart Rl), although other cases also are considered. As the two
landmark abortion decisions, Roe and Casey are focal points for obvious
reasons; Carhart II, the most recent major decision, provides significant in-
sights into the potential future of abortion jurisprudence. Part III considers
the narratives about prenatal life and how they correspond to the depiction
of the woman. Part IV evaluates the narratives as they relate to the constitu-
tional standards developed by the Court. Part V argues that the narratives
constructed by the Court serve both expressive and normative functions,
acting to reinforce abortion stigma and narrow the constitutional legitimacy
of reproductive freedom.
I. GRAND ILLUSION
A. Language and Narrative
Language reflects common understandings within a social context.8
Language also plays a central role in social change movements, as competing
interests seek to capture the terminology of public discourse.9 Two types of
rhetorical methods, identified in this article as vocabulary and narrative, are
particularly relevant to discussion of social and legal discourse.10 Vocabulary
includes characterization and ultimate terms.II A characterization is a "uni-
versalized depiction[ I of important agents, scenes, purposes or methods,"
such as the use of "back alley" to evoke the horrors of illegal abortions.12
Ultimate terms, or ideographs, are "special words or phrases that express the
public values that provide the 'constitutional' commitments of a commu-
nity," such as liberty or life.'3
8. CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT, DECODING ABORTION RHETORIC 4, 14 (1990); L.H.
LkRUE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW As FICTION: NARRATIVE IN THE RHETORIC OF Au-
THORITY 6, 11 (1995).
9. LARUE, supra note 8, at 6, 11; CONDIT, supra note 8, at 5-6, 96-98, 106-07.
10. CONDIT, supra note 8, at 13-14. "Rhetoric" can be defined as simply as the "art of
persuasion" or as complexly as "a conscious perspective on language that sees it as a
means not of interpretation but of the product of a broad range of 'texts."' FRANCES
J. RANNEY, ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS AND LEGAL RHETORIC: AN ANALYSIS OF LAN-
GUAGE BELIEFS AND THE LAw 10, 17 (2005).
11. CONDIT, supra note 8, at 13.
12. Id. at 14.
13. Id. at 13.
[Vol. 19:293296
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Narrative, widely used in American jurisprudence, is a powerful rhe-
torical device.14 Narratives often take the form of "social myths," which "tell
important truths, but . . . leave out important ingredients, and, hence, dis-
tort."'5 The persuasive value of narrative lies largely in its ability to engage
the audience in an empathetic or sympathetic response.' 6 For example, the
1950s criminal abortion law reform movement was successful, in part, be-
cause narratives of illegal abortions were used to bring the issue to the public
discourse forefront in a way that was palpable to the white, middle-class
majority.17 These narratives relied on the archetype of woman as victim,
confronting the prospect of illegal abortion when her pregnancy resulted
from rape or incest, or when it presented severe health issues to herself or
the fetus.I8
In the debates about abortion regulation, both sides of the dispute also
seek to dominate the terms of public discourse through vocabulary. Their
strategy is similar: reduce complex and controversial issues into simple, pow-
erful, and opposing paradigms.' 9 The paradigms are readily identifiable by
their ultimate terms: choice/life, woman/mother, fetus/baby, abortionist/
physician, dignity/murder.20 These differentiations in turn are incorporated
into the abortion narratives. This very public rhetoric finds its way into
court documents, oral arguments, and, ultimately, court opinions. 2 1
14. Id.
15. Id
16. Id at 25. Typically, the protagonists of successful narratives must be "ordinary peo-
ple" because that creates "identification" of the audience with them, and large-scale
change requires that a large number of people feel affected by the particular social
evil at issue. Id at 26. Successful narratives are "emotionally compelling," "socially
effective," and "well designed." Id. at 27-28.
17. Id. at 23.
18. Id. at 25-26. These narratives were:
strategic adaptation[s] of women's experiences. . . . To be persuasive to the
dominant audience, the stories had to use rather than confront the beliefs
and social conditions [such as the nuclear family and woman's primary role
as mother] in the existing American repertoire. The abortion story did so by
respecting the crucial values and characterizations of the culture while rede-
fining the act of abortion itself.
Id. at 25 (emphasis in original).
19. Id. at 61-63.
20. Id. "Abortionist," used in cases such as Casey to describe the physicians who perform
abortions, means "[a] person who carries out or induces abortions, [especially] ille-
gally or in secret." Abortionist Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DicrIONARY, supra note
1.
21. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (noting the
"bond of love the mother has for her child" when discussing abortion and her poten-
tial for "regret"); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The whole argument of abortion opponents is that what the
2013]1 297
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
Judicial opinions frequently employ narrative to distill complex factual
or legal issues into a coherent and simplified theme. This distillation process
necessarily selects certain facts and truths; it disregards and omits others.
The construction of the judicial narrative from this information includes
the selection of rhetorical vocabulary.22 The parties before the Court com-
pete to persuade the Court to employ both their legal arguments and their
vocabulary.23 The socio-rhetorical vocabulary employed in the political
arena gains legitimacy and power when the Court incorporates that lan-
guage into legal analysis.24
The vocabulary deployed by the Court thus constructs far more than
the metes and bounds of legal norms. The abortion decisions embody both
legal and social discourse. The language of legal discourse illuminates the
social constructs and assumptions that underlie the articulation of legal
norms.25 Thus the terminology selected by the Court invokes norms and
expectations about both the pregnant woman and prenatal life.26 The narra-
Court calls the fetus and what others call the unborn child is a human life."); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) ("[1]t is reasonable and appropriate for a State to
decide that at some point in time another interest, that of the health of the mother
or that of the potential human life, becomes significantly involved."). See also Brief
for Sandra Cano et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Gonzales v. Carhart,
550 U.S. 124 (2007) (No. 05-380) (2006 WL 1436684) (arguing against the health
exception, offering 180 affadivits of women who previously had abortions). The
Court cites to this brief to support its conclusion that "some women come to regret
their choice to abort an infant life they once created and sustained." Carhart II, 550
U.S. at 159. See also Brief for the National Organization for Women as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellees, Webster v. Repro. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989)
(No. 86-605) (1989 WL 1127691) (arguing that the Court should retain the right
to choose).
22. CONDIT, supra note 8, at 96.
23. Id.
24. Id. "Once ... competing vocabularies are developed, advocates frequently move the
discussion into the domain of the law in order to place the coercive power of the
state behind their vocabularies, and, hence, their interests." Id
25. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1969);
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 92-101 (1975) (explaining that the
government creates standards through punishment); MICHEL FoUCAULT, I THE
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 146-47 (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1976)
(discussing "the hysterization of women").
26. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the
Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS
571, 575-76 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993) (discussing gendered abortion jurispru-
dence which pits the woman's interest against that of the fetus and male society,
presupposing that the "opposing" interests are necessarily not "symbiotically
linked"); Margot Stubbs, Feminism and Legal Postivism, in FEMINIsT LEGAL THE-
ORY: FOUNDATIONs 454, 454-56 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993) (discussing the
detrimental impact of moral analysis within the law on "the development of a femi-
nist critique of law").
[Vol. 19:293298
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tives created through this terminology reflect, ultimately, a debate about the
moral value of women who seek abortions.27 This debate remains grounded
in the relationship between woman and mother. Legislation regulating abor-
tion serves as the most overt example of how women seeking abortions are
judged for their deviance from the role of mother. Statutory exceptions for
rape, incest, or where there is risk to the pregnant woman's life or health
demarcate the line between woman as subject and woman as object or
woman as actor and woman as victim. No such exceptions exist to account
for economic, education, or career hardships.
The moral judgments embodied in positive law find less obvious ex-
pression in the language the Court uses to evaluate abortion legislation.
This language reveals an increasing inclination to identify woman as
mother. When the Court employs the mother narrative in its discourse on
abortion, it reinforces the stigma that women who seek abortions fail the
social expectations constructed for ifeininlity.
B. Stigma
Stigma is a powerful tool of social control. The dictionary defines
stigma as "a mark of disgrace." 28 Erving Goffman defines stigma as an "at-
tribute that is deeply discrediting" that reduces the bearer "from a whole
and usual person to a tainted, discounted one."29 Abortion stigma can be
defined as a "negative attribute ascribed to women who seek to terminate a
pregnancy that marks them, internally or externally, as inferior to ideals of
womanhood."30 These ideals evoke traditional stereotypes that allow female
sexuality only for procreation, identify women as mothers, and expect nur-
turing and self-sacrificing behavior.3
Abortion stigma is generated through social, political, economic, and
legal institutions that depict abortion as deviant and women who seek abor-
tions as "promiscuous, sinful, selfish, dirty, irresponsible, heartless or mur-
derous."32 Abortion has a long history of association with stigma. Women
who sought abortions were shamed for violating cultural stereotypes that
required women to refrain from non-procreative sex and to embrace their
27. See, e.g., Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124, 128-29 (2007).
28. Stigma Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra, note 1.
29. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY
3 (1963).
30. Anuradha Kumar et al., Conceptualising Abortion Stigma, 11 CULTURE, HEALTH &
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roles as mothers.33 Abortion was identified with out-of-wedlock sex, promis-
cuity, and prostitution.34 And prior to Roe, the culture of "back alley" abor-
tions marked abortion as criminal, dirty, and harmful to women.35
The legalization of abortion did not eliminate the stigma. In fact, the
backlash against legalized abortion suggests an enduring legacy of stigma.
Restrictions on access to abortion and intrusive informed consent require-
ments send a message that abortion is immoral. The exclusion of abortion
coverage from government and, increasingly, private health insurance dem-
onstrates how political and economic policies create abortion stigma. Termi-
nology and framing discourse are critical tools. One powerful example of
how language generates stigma is the use of "abortionist" to characterize the
physician who performs the procedure.3 6
Stigma as defined in the research literature typically includes multiple
components. 3 7 For the purposes of this article, I rely on a theory of stigma
generation proposed by Link and Phelan that captures the complex dynam-
ics of how stigma is produced and reproduced. They conceptualize the com-
ponents of stigma creation as follows: (1) LABELING-the dominant culture
identifies and labels human differences; (2) STEREOTYPING-the dominant
culture links the labeled persons to undesirable characteristics; (3) SEPARA-
TION-the labeled persons are then distinguished from the dominant cul-
ture; (4) STATUS Loss AND DISCRIMINATION-those labeled "them"
experience loss of status and/or discrimination21 Finally, the generation of
stigma depends upon social, economic, or political power inequities that
permit both the construction of stereotypes and the consequences of disap-
proval or discrimination.3
Law mediates the role of stigma in society in a variety of ways. Law
can prevent stigma from serving as a justification for discrimination. 40 Law
33. Id; see also Richard W. Bourne, Abortion In 1938 and Today: Plus (a Change, Plus
C'est La Mime Chose, 12 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 225, 229 (2003)
(describing one woman's experience).
34. See Bourne, supra note 33, at 229-30 n.15, 247.
35. Alison Norris et al., Abortion Stigma: A Reconceptualization of Constituents, Causes,
and Consequences, 21:3S WOMEN'S HEALTH ISSUES S49, S52 (May 2011), available
at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/Abortion-Stigma.pdf.
36. Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart 1), 530 U.S. 914, 953-54 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing), 957-60, 964-65, 968, 974-76 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See also, Justice Ken-
nedy's majority opinion in Carhart I, where he shifts language from "abortionist" to
"abortion doctor." 550 U.S. 124, 138, 144, 154-55, 161, 163 (2007).
37. Norris, supra note 35, at S52.
38. B. Link & J.C. Phelan, Conceptualizing Stigma, 27 ANN. REV. OF Soc. 363, 367
(2001).
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
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can remedy the harm caused by stigma.4 1 Law may also be a means through
which stigma is generated or reinforced. 42 Sometimes the creation of stigma
is deliberate social policy, as in anti-smoking policies that may stigmatize
smokers.4 3 Law, less directly, also serves a potent expressive role in the gen-
eration or diminishment of stigma. Legal standards and legal analysis may
reinforce or reject stigma. This is particularly true when the courts address
controversial social issues. The holding of the case and the attendant legal
standard will have substantial impact on the mediation of stigma. But the
language and assumptions employed by a court may also send powerful
messages concerning stigma.
The terminology and framing discourse found in the Court's abortion
jurisprudence contribute to the social construction of abortion stigma. The
Court's abortion decisions are marked by ambivalence, and at times hostil-
ity, toward abortion and the women who seek abortions. The political dis-
course of fetal personhood is increasingly reproduced in Court opinions.
What the Court says about a woman who seeks an abortion, and about
prenatal life, communicates not simply legal judgment but a moral assess-
ment that in turn shapes public discourse.
II. SCENT OF A WoMAN
Who are the characters that populate the morality plays embedded in
the Supreme Court decisions on abortion? Surprisingly, with the exception
of Casey, the Court offers very little direct discussion of the woman who
seeks an abortion, her life, her needs, her challenges.4 4 The narratives con-
structed by the Court instead are developed through vocabulary and
through how the discourse on abortion is framed. The female figure is at
times cast in the leading role, sometimes as woman, sometimes as mother.
On other occasions the female role becomes supporting, overshadowed by
the prominence given the "baby" or the "child." In some circumstances, the
female lead disappears, reduced to a collection of body parts, reminiscent of
Picasso's women, or to a state of invisibility.
Given the conflict of values embraced by the Court, it is not surpris-
ing that the depiction of the woman who may seek an abortion varies from
41. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
42. Scott Burris, Stigma and the Law, 367 THE LANCET 529, 530 (2006); Kumar, supra
note 30, at 631.
43. See Burris, supra note 42, at, 367. The law may also perpetuate existing stigma, as in
the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996). MARK PHILLIP STRASSER, LE-
GALLY WED: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 151-52 (1997).
44. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S 833, 928-29 (1992). Roe includes
a brief discussion of the problems an unwanted pregnancy may pose. Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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decision to decision. These narratives exist as subtext to the formalized dis-
cussions of undue burdens, fundamental rights, and liberty. The choice of
woman or mother as the central character stimulates several related narra-
tives. The "mother" monologues typically embody the anti-choice narrative
for, obviously, the very definition of mother belies the validity of choice.
The story of the "woman" who appears in the Court's opinions is more
complicated. 'While she may at times be an autonomous person capable of
self-determination and worthy of dignity, woman also plays the foil to
mother. In this she represents the dehumanized, selfish pursuer of conve-
nience. Or she appears as the passive recipient, incapable of sound judg-
ment, or the vulnerable social being. And it is woman, not mother, who is
reduced to body parts or rendered invisible.
Conflicting narratives often overlap within the same decisions, punc-
tuating the Court's ambivalence. If we examine these narratives, what gener-
ally emerges is the use of traditional stereotypes to attribute negative
characteristics to the woman who seeks to terminate her pregnancy.
A. Woman Under the Influence
The narrative of woman as the passive recipient begins with Roe. Al-
though the Roe Court concludes that the right of privacy, found in the
Fourteenth Amendment's "concept of personal liberty," is "broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy," 5 Roe does not emphasize the decision-making autonomy of the
woman. To the contrary, the Court deems the woman a passive object in
her pregnancy when it asserts, " [t]he pregnant woman cannot be isolated in
her privacy."4 6 This singular phrase opens the door for what will become the
state's looming presence throughout the pregnancy. In Roe, both the state
and the physician own a stake in her pregnancy and she must cede part of
her privacy to their interests.4 7 The state enters the pregnancy during the
second trimester to regulate in furtherance of the woman's health; it re-
mains until birth to protect prenatal life.48 The physician's interests go even
further, spanning the entire pregnancy, and it is the authority of the physi-
cian, not the woman, that the Court emphasizes. 49
45. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
46. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
47. Roe, 410 U.S. at 150-52.
48. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
49. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 ("This means, on the other hand, that, for the period
of pregnancy prior to this 'compelling' point, the attending physician, in consulta-
tion with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in
his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated."); Id. at
165-66 ("The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical
[Vol. 19:293302
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Roe may begin with a statement of autonomy but it ends with the
woman being reduced to the battleground on which the state and the physi-
cian stake out their interests.50 The Court equivocates even on the extent of
a woman's authority during the first trimester, when the decision to abort is
subject only to the most minimal health regulation.51 As the Court makes
clear, it is the physician's concerns rather than the woman's that prevail
during the first trimester. The Court's summary of its groundbreaking deci-
sion reduces the woman to passive object when it describes the right to
choose during the first trimester as a decision that "must be left to the
medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician."52 The
Court goes further by suggesting that it must balance primarily the interests
of the state and the physician:
The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer
medical trcatment . . . up to die points where important state
interests provide compelling justifications for intervention. Up
treatment according to his professional judgment up to the points where important
state interests provide compelling justifications for intervention.").
50. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, How the Supreme Court Talks AboutAbortion: The Impli-
cations of a Shifting Discourse, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 41, 47-48 (2008).
The brief on the merits for Jane Roe told the Court that under the Texas
law, "When pregnancy begins, a woman is faced with a governmental man-
date compelling her to serve as an incubator for months and then as an
ostensibly willing mother for up to twenty or more years," perhaps causing
her to forgo education and career and "endure economic and social hard-
ships." . . . [but] the Court was clearly responsive to the brief filed by a
coalition of medical groups, [which told the Court] the Texas law was a
"serious obstacle to good medical practice," . . . imposing restrictions that
"interfere with the physician-patient relationship and with the ability of
physicians to practice medicine in accordance with the highest professional
standards."
Id. (citing Brief on the Merits for Appellants at 106; and Brief of the Am. Coll. Of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 2, Roe
v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
51. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
52. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164. A law clerk for Justice Powell expressed concern about the
direction of Justice Blackmun's draft opinion, and attempted to preempt the opin-
ion's emphasis on the role of the physician. The clerk wrote a memo to Justice
Powell, urging him to take the matter up with Justice Blackmun, saying, "Doesn't it
seem that this language overstates the doctor's role and undercuts the woman's per-
sonal interest in the decision? All medical decisions are the product of an agreement
between patient and doctor. I see no reason, therefore, not to add a clause to this
sentence indicating that the abortion decision must rest 'with the physician and his
patient."' Greenhouse, supra note 50, at 42 (citing Memorandum from Larry A.
Hammond to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Supreme Court of the U.S. (Nov. 27,
1972)).
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to those points, the abortion decision in all its aspects is inher-
ently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility
for it must rest with the physician.53
Decisions after Roe continued to emphasize the dominance of the phy-
sician. One such decision stated, "Roe stressed repeatedly the central role of
the physician, both in consulting with the woman about whether or not to
have an abortion, and in determining how any abortion was to be carried
out."54 The Court, on occasion, offers the patient a partnership with her
physician, as in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,5 where
the Court rejects the authority of the state to exercise a "veto over the deci-
sion of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy."56
But more typically, the right to choose is depicted as primarily a medical
issue where the physician is the actor and the woman the object. Thus when
the Court emphasizes abortion as a "medical procedure," it shifts the exper-
tise for the decision from woman to physician while at the same time sug-
gesting that part of the woman's right to choose is allowing her physician to
make the appropriate medical decision: "[T]he full vindication of the
woman's fundamental right necessarily requires that her physician be given
'the room he needs to make his best medical judgment."57 In this scenario,
even the woman's decision becomes passive in the face of the physician's
control because "[t]he physician's exercise of this medical judgment encom-
passes both assisting the woman in the decisionmaking [sic] process and
implementing her decision."58 The physician's potential liability under
abortion statutes certainly justifies consideration of the doctor's interests.
But the Court's discussion of choice does not distinguish between the physi-
cian's interests and the woman's. To the contrary, her decision, and thus her
right, becomes dependent upon the judgment of the physician. This judg-
mental dependency reinforces the depiction of woman as object rather than
subject. Most notably, it subsumes the choice protected by Roe within the
physician's medical judgment.
B. What Women Want
Closely related to the narrative of woman as object is the construct of
a woman who acts but whose judgment cannot be trusted. Her decision to
53. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165-66.
54. Colaucti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1979).
55. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
56. 428 U.S. at 74.
57. Akron I, 462 U.S. 416, 427 (1983), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
58. Akron I, 462 U.S. at 427.
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terminate an abortion is the product of irrational thinking; the state is justi-
fied in asking her to reconsider. Distrust of woman's judgment is pervasive
throughout law and history.59 The pre-Roe laws prohibiting abortion except
when the woman's life or health was at stake assume that a woman's judg-
ment about when to seek an abortion is insufficient. In modern abortion
legislation, this distrust emerges in onerous informed consent laws and laws
mandating twenty-four-hour waiting periods. 6 0 Restrictive abortion laws
with exceptions for pregnancies caused by rape and incest reflect hostility
toward women who do not meet the socially accepted role of victim. A great
deal has been written already about how these types of laws rest on stereo-
types about women's judgment and moral authority but a few points are
worth emphasizing here for they relate to the broader question of narrative
developed by the Court.6 1
The parameters of the debate over women's judgment were set in Roe
and its companion case, Doe. 62 The Roe majority's protection of the
woman's right to choose without the state fully dictating the terms of that
choice evoked antipathy from the dissent.63 Justice White disparaged
women's moral authority by characterizing the right to choose as one that
"values the convenience, whim, or caprice of the putative mother more than
the life or potential life of the fetus."6 4 This rejection of women's judgment
provides the justification for the invisibility of women in later decisions
advancing the moral authority of the state to protect fetal life.6 1
Under Roe, the Court struggled to distinguish between permissible
medical procedures and impermissible stereotyping. The respect for
woman's decision-making found voice in the Court's insistence that the
state could not enact abortion regulations "designed to influence the
woman's informed choice between abortion or childbirth." 66 The Court up-
held narrowly tailored informed consent requirements relevant to health but
rejected numerous sweeping laws and twenty-four-hour waiting periods that
59. Paula Abrams, The Tradition ofReproduction, 37 ARiz. L. REv. 453, 463-70 (1995).
60. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-33 (West 1996); 18 PA. CONS. STAT § 3205
(West 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 253.10(3)(a)-(c) (West 2011).
61. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Hendricks, Body and Soul: Equality, Pregnancy, and the Unitary
Right to Abortion, 45 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 329, 368 (2010); B. Jessie Hill,
Reproductive Rights as Health Care Rights, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 501, 510-14
(2009); Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Deci-
sion-Making, 16 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 223 (2009).
62. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
63. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
64. Doe, 410 U.S. at 221 (White, J., dissenting).
65. See, e.g., Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124, 159-63 (2007); Webster v. Reprod. Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 405-07, 520 (1989).
66. Akron 1, 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505. U.S. 833 (1992).
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posed substantial burdens and were calculated to persuade women to forego
abortion.67 As the Court described an invalid informed consent requirement
in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,68 "The
States are not free, under the guise of protecting maternal health or poten-
tial life, to intimidate women into continuing pregnancies."6' At the same
time, the Court often displayed considerable ambivalence towards the
woman's exercise of judgment. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth,70 the Court upheld an informed consent requirement, despite the
fact that the only other procedures subject to similar restrictions by the state
were those performed on persons committed to mental or correctional insti-
tutions.7 1 The Court found the special treatment of abortion justified be-
cause "[t]he decision to abort ... is an important, and often a stressful one,
and it is desirable and imperative that it be made with full knowledge of its
nature and consequences."7 2 The Court's readiness to view abortion regula-
tion as unique ignores the relationship between laws mistrusting women's
judgment and the gendered essence of the abortion decision. Chief Justice
Burger's dissent in Thornburgh exemplifies this indifference, recognizing
that informed consent requirements for abortion differ from other medical
procedures without questioning why: "Can anyone doubt that the State
could impose a similar requirement with respect to other medical
procedures?"73
The Court's shift to the undue burden standard in Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,74 allows states to incorporate mistrust
of women's judgment into social policy. Overruling Akron I and Thorn-
burgh to the extent these cases invalidated state requirements mandating
truthful, non-misleading information about abortion, Casey pivots to a def-
erential standard that goes a long way towards insulating informed consent
requirements and twenty-four-hour waiting periods from facial challenge.75
Casey's recasting of the informed consent debate undermines the legitimacy
of a woman's decision in two significant ways. As in previous cases, the
Court accepts the implicit assumption that the state is justified in protecting
women from their potential lack of serious and informed consideration of
the abortion decision.76 But the Casey reasoning goes further, approving
67. Akron I, 462 U.S. at 452.
68. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
69. 476 U.S. at 759.
70. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
71. 428 U.S. at 66 n.6 (citing Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.700 (1969)).
72. 428 U.S. at 67.
73. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 783 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
74. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
75. 505 U.S. at 881-87.
76. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881-84 (1992).
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state efforts to dissuade a woman from her decision to seek an abortion and
pitting the state's interest in protecting prenatal life as a valid challenge to
the woman's judgment. The joint opinion in Casey describes the informed
consent requirement as a legitimate attempt "to ensure that a woman appre-
hend the full consequences of her decision," so that she will not "discover
later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision was not
fully informed."77 Likewise, the twenty-four-hour waiting period struck
down in prior cases is upheld with no recognition by the Court of the
stereotype it embraces through this language: "[t]he idea that important de-
cisions will be more informed and deliberate if they follow some period of
reflection does not strike us as unreasonable . . . ."78
Casey's rejection of Roe's trimester analysis, in large part because it fails
to give sufficient weight to the state's interest in prenatal life,79 allows the
state to challenge directly the judgment of the woman with the full weight
of its authority. The very premise of the Court's earlier rejection of in-
formed consent regulations and waiting periods was that state efforts to
dissuade a woman from her choice of abortion were per se illegitimate pre-
cisely because they showed a lack of respect for her decision.8 0 Casey's sleight
of hand in recasting these laws as legitimate illuminates how the constitu-
tional standard can be impacted by a shift from a narrative of moral author-
ity to one of questionable moral competence. Unlike Roe, Casey allows
potentially two state "checks" on a woman's judgment before she is allowed
to act on her decision.
The altered narrative underlying Casey's validation of informed con-
sent and waiting periods is not lost on the dissents. Justice Blackmun calls
laws designed to dissuade a woman from her decision "the antithesis of
informed consent."- Justice Stevens, in dissent, recognizes the Court's ac-
ceptance of the twenty-four-hour waiting period for what it is, a burden
that is predicated "on outmoded and unacceptable assumptions about the
decisionmaking capacity of women."82 A law based on respect for women
would recognize that "[n]o person undertakes such a decision lightly," and
that "States may not presume that a woman has failed to reflect adequately
merely because her conclusion differs from the State's preference."11
77. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
78. Casey, 505 U.S. at 885.
79. Casey, 505 U.S. at 873.
80. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881-86.
81. Casey, 505 U.S. at 936 (Blackmun, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
764 (1986)).
82. Casey, 505 U.S. at 918 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in par).
83. Casey, 505 U.S. at 919 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The Court's treatment of spousal consent requirements invokes famil-
iar stereotypes that pit a woman's judgment against that of her husband.
Although the Court invalidated a spousal consent requirement in Dan-
forth,84 it characterized the interests of the husband in one-dimensional and
glowing terms while suggesting that a woman who fails to gain the approval
of her husband prior to an abortion may be responsible for destroying the
marriage. The Court lauds the "deep and proper concern and interest that a
devoted and protective husband has in his wife's pregnancy" and opines that
"[n]o marriage may be viewed as harmonious or successful if the marriage
partners are fundamentally divided on so important and vital an issue."5
But the responsibility for the harmony rests primarily on the woman. A
woman who, "without the approval of her husband, decides to terminate
her pregnancy . . . is acting unilaterally."a6 This depiction of marital bliss
ignores, of course, the reality that fear of violence or other abuse may be the
reason a wife may not discuss the abortion decision with her husband.<?
The Court recognizes this reality in Casey when it invalidates the
Pennsylvania spousal notification provision, but it does so in language that
both repudiates stereotypes and reinforces them. The joint opinion goes to
great length to dismiss spousal notification requirements as the product of
an era "when a different understanding of the family and of the Constitu-
tion prevailed,"88 a time when "a woman had no legal existence separate
from her husband"9 and she was expected to fulfill "special responsibili-
ties"90 in the home that "precluded full and independent legal status under
the Constitution."9 1 But "[t]hese views, of course, are no longer consistent
with our understanding of the family, the individual, or the Constitu-
tion."92 Indeed, the opinion emphasizes:
The marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind
and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each
with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, mar-
ried or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intru-
84. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 70 (1976).
85. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69, 71.
86. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71.
87. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 889 (stating the District Court's finding that notification of
pregnancy is a frequent cause of family violence).
88. Casey, 505 U.S. at 896.
89. Casey, 505 U.S. at 897 (quoting Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130, 141 (1873) (Brad-
ley, J., joined by Swayne and Field, J.J., concurring in judgment)).
90. Casey, 505 U.S. at 897 (quoting Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961)).
91. Casey, 505 U.S. at 897.
92. Casey, 505 U.S. at 897.
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sion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child.9
But the joint opinion's reasoning on spousal notification is not grounded
primarily in the recognition of women's constitutional independence. In-
stead, it is the potential of domestic abuse that leads the plurality to con-
clude that the provision constitutes an undue burden." The joint opinion's
emphasis on domestic violence draws heavily on stereotypical views of
women as victims.
Not surprisingly, the unreliable woman at times is characterized as a
victim by virtue of her social vulnerability. But here, she typically gets little
support from the Court. In three cases addressing government funding of
abortion, the Court concluded that the state is under no constitutional obli-
gation to fund an abortion sought by an indigent woman because it is the
woman's poverty, not the state, that has created the obstacle to obtaining an
abortion.91 The result of these decisions, as Justice Blackmun argued in dis-
sent, is "punitive and tragic."96 These cases marked the first post-Roe deci-
sions where the state's interest in promoting childbirth prevailed over the
woman's right to choose. In Carbart II, the dissent argued that restrictions
on late-term abortions are likely to disproportionately affect indigent
women and adolescents, who "are more likely than other woman to have
difficulty obtaining an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy."9 7
The economically and socially vulnerable women in these cases earn the
Court's disdain, not its compassion.
The questioned and questionable woman is at the center of the
Court's decision in Carhart I." Although the opinion invokes multiple
gendered archetypes, it is the woman's potential for faulty judgment that
most concerns the Court. Her fragile emotional state makes it likely that a
woman will "regret" her decision to abort and, as a result, suffer dire emo-
tional consequences, including "[s]evere depression and loss of esteem.""
Admitting there is "no reliable data" to support these conclusions, the
Court nonetheless embraces a woman-protective rationale that bears little
relevance to the medically driven choices typically associated with late-term
93. Casey, 505 U.S. at 896 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
94. Casey, 505 U.S. at 893-94.
95. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 447 n.15
(1977) (citing Maher, 432 U.S. at 482); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977)
(citing Maher, 432 U.S. 464). See also Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490, 491-92, 509-11 (1989).
96. Beal, 432 U.S. at 462 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
97. Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124, 173 n.13 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
98. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
99. Carbart II, 550 U.S. at 159.
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abortions.oo It relies on an amicus brief containing personal testimonies of
regret from women who had chosen abortion.o1 Ignored by the Court is
the amicus brief that tells different stories, stories of women who needed the
late-term procedure now banned by the Act.10 2
Not content with insisting on the psychological weakness of women,
the Court claims that this weakness may make the informed consent process
suspect. As the Court describes it, "[i]n a decision so fraught with emotional
consequence some doctors may prefer not to disclose . . . the means that
will be used."03 This language is a gratuitous attack on women's moral
authority, for the statute has nothing to do with informed consent.
The woman-protective rationale is the most recent expression of dis-
trust of women's judgment. A woman must be protected from choosing an
abortion because of the emotional harm she will suffer.o 4 The argument
remains a prominent political tool, despite the fact that medical authorities
100. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 159. See also Caitlin E. Borgmann, Judicial Evasion and
Disingenuous Legislative Appeals to Science in the Abortion Controversy, 17 J.L. &
PoLY 15 (2008).
Particularly noteworthy was the Court's reliance on an amicus brief con-
taining testimonials against abortion that were also cited by a legislatively
appointed, highly partisan South Dakota task force. The South Dakota leg-
islature relied on the task force's factual findings in enacting a complete ban
on abortions in South Dakota. Two anti-abortion lawyers who were archi-
tects of the South Dakota strategy acknowledged an implicit conversation
between the South Dakota law's advocates and the Court on this point.
They wrote that the South Dakota law and its defense in federal court have
"been litigated with an eye towards Justice Kennedy" . . . and that "[it was
not a coincidence that Justice Kennedy cited to [an amicus brief] which
related the experiences of post-abortive women."
Id. at 28-29.
101. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 159 (citing Brief of Sandra Cano, the Former "Mary Doe" of
Doe v. Bolton, et al as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 22-24, Gonzales v.
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (No. 05-380), 2006 W 1436684 at *22-*24).
102. Brief of the Inst. for Reprod. Health Access et al as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents in Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, et al., &
Motion for Leave to File Brief Out of Time in Support of Respondents in Gonzales
v. Carhart, et al., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (Nos. 05-1382 &
05-380), 2006 WL 2736633.
103. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 159.
104. REPORT OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION, 9, 55, 65-67
(2005), available at http://www.dakotavoice.com/Docs/South%20Dakota%2OAbor-
tion%20Task%20Force%20Report.pdf (discussing the need to protect the pregnant
mother and her fundamental intrinsic right to a relationship with her child). This
report was submitted to the Governor and Legislature of South Dakota in 2005.
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have discredited the validity of a "post-abortion stress syndrome." 05 Justice
Kennedy admits the claim is without "reliable data." o6 But the Court
adopts this rhetoric of anti-choice proponents, rhetoric that amounts to a
repackaging of deeply entrenched stereotypes about women's capabilities.
C The Incredible Shrinking Woman
If at times the woman seeking an abortion is portrayed as a passive
participant or an unreliable decision-maker, on other occasions her physical
humanity disappears. Several of the Court's opinions reduce women to
mere body parts, surrealistic depictions of woman as a womb disconnected
from both body and dignity. Other opinions further dehumanize the
woman, rendering her invisible by omitting her from the legal analysis.
These portrayals literally deny women legitimacy and moral authority.
The most signifcant construct used to reduce wonian to a disem-
bodied "womb" is the Court's use of the viability standard. Roe defines via-
bility as the point at which the fetus is "potentially able to live outside the
mother's womb."107 It is the womb that is the focus of this standard, irre-
spective of its incorporation in a woman's body. Even the reference to
"mother's womb" reduces simply to "womb" in later opinions, as in Casey,
where the plurality defines viability as "the time at which there is a realistic
possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb."loi This
language conjures an image of the fetus disengaged from the woman's body,
making irrelevant the woman who maintains and nourishes the fetus prior
to viability. The viability standard relies on the point at which prenatal life
may be freed from its physiological dependency on the womb. Until that
time the organ of gestation, the womb, is the reference point. At viability
the state enters the womb to protect the fetus.
105. Brief for Amicus Curiae Am. Psychological Ass'n in Support of Appellees at 14,
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605), 1989 WL
1127695 at *14. See also Greenhouse, supra note 50.
The Carhart majority opinion thus adopts the discredited theory of a "post-
abortion syndrome" that inflicts lasting emotional damage on women who
have had abortions. Although embraced by such organizations as Feminists
for Life of America, where Jane Sullivan Roberts, the wife of Chief Justice
Roberts, once served as executive vice president of the board of directors
and currently as pro bono legal counsel, the theory has been widely de-
bunked in the medical literature.
Id. at 56 (citing Kerri-Ann Kinorski, The Aftermath ofAbortion, 5 AM. FEMINIST 6
(1998)).
106. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 159.
107. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973).
108. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992).
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In Roe and Casey, the Court may at times reduce woman to womb,
but at least the opinions also recognize her rights and interests. Far more
dramatic is the Court's treatment of women in the cases addressing "partial-
birth abortion" laws. 1o9 Carhart l and Carhart il focus on the physician and
the fetus; the woman is identified alternatively by her womb,llo cervix, or
vagina."' These dynamics are understandable to some extent since the stat-
utes regulate a particular abortion procedure. But by deleting the woman
from the scene, the Court leaves the impression that only the doctor and the
fetus are impacted by the procedure. In Carhart II, the Court's focus on
fetal life, discussed below, diminishes the physiological and moral signifi-
cance of the woman. Justice Kennedy emphasizes, "a fetus is a living organ-
ism while within the womb, whether or not it is viable outside the
womb."12 With this language, the fetus gains an embodied identity that is
not ascribed to the woman. Thus the woman, as womb, serves to nurture
the "living organism"; she is depicted as the grammatical and physical ad-
dendum to the fetus and reduced to terminology that denies her essential
personhood.
The ultimate diminishment of woman occurs in opinions where she is
invisible, or nearly invisible. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas have authored opinions about abortion that do not mention
women. Rehnquist's dissent in Carhart I, urging the Court to overrule
Casey, contains no references to women.1 13 Likewise, the concurrence of
Justice Thomas in Carhart II, also arguing that Casey and Roe should be
overruled, does not once discuss the woman.' 1 4 The plurality opinion in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
mentions the woman primarily when quoting statutory language or case
precedent, choosing instead to focus almost exclusively on the interests of
the state in regulating abortion.'15
These depictions of women as female reproductive organs or as irrele-
vant to the abortion analysis create a narrative that powerfully denies per-
sonhood and moral authority. A woman who seeks an abortion does not
deserve to be recognized as a complete being. Denied personhood, her value
109. One pair of physicians describes the term as an "evocative neologism" that is "inten-
tional disinformation." See David A. Grimes & Gretchen Stuart, Abortion jabber-
wocky: The Need for Better Terminology, 81 CONTRACEPTION 93, 93-94 (2010).
110. Carbart II, 550 U.S. 124, 147 (2007).
111. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 135; Carhart I 530 U.S. 914, 940 (2000).
112. Carhart I 550 U.S. at 147.
113. Carbart I, 550 U.S. at 952.
114. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 168-69.
115. 492 U.S. 490, 490-522 (1989) (The plurality opinion mentions "woman" thirty




derives from her fulfillment of state interests, i.e., the physical maintenance
of prenatal life.
D. Woman on Top
The portrayal of woman as an autonomous moral authority, sug-
gested, but not realized, in Roe, emerged eventually, thirteen years later, in
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.116 In
Thornburgh, the majority opinion of Justice Blackmun, who found the
woman's voice missing in Roe, focuses on the liberty interests of the woman,
not her physician, and it explicitly grants her both dignity and moral value:
Few decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly
private, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than
a woman's decision-with the guidance of her physician and
within the limits specified in Roe-whether to end her pregnancy.
A woman's right to make that choice freely is fundamental. Any
other result, in our view, would protect inadequately a central
part of the sphere of liberty that our law guarantees equally to
all. 117
The narrative of woman as a moral decision-maker reached its pinna-
cle six years later in Casey. The focus of the abortion decision is not the
physician or the state, for "the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense
unique to the human condition and so unique to the law.""" Indeed, Casey
recognizes "the urgent claims of the woman to retain the ultimate control
over her destiny and her body [are] claims implicit in the meaning of lib-
erty."" 9 This liberty includes "the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime."120 Casey emphasizes that these intimate
choices are "central to personal dignity and autonomy."l21 Dignity and au-
tonomy are, in turn, essential to liberty.122 Liberty, as Casey defines it, con-
cerns the constitutional relationship between individual and government:
"At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence,
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."l23
116. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
117. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772.
118. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
119. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869.
120. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
121. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
122. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
123. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
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This narrative is constructed on "woman," her autonomy and per-
sonhood, not her role as mother. She is recognized as a social actor with
options other than motherhood. The attribution of these moral decisions to
the woman represents a significant departure from prior narratives of depen-
dence and incompetence. Casey identifies reproductive freedom as a central
and self-defining facet of identity, a predicate to the realization of other
social, economic, or political identities. Or, as the joint opinion explains,
"[t]he ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life
of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproduc-
tive lives."124
This language joins reproductive choice, equality, and self-determina-
tion into a narrative of dignity missing from the Roe analysis of choice:
"[F]or two decades of economic and social developments, people have or-
ganized intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of
themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of abor-
tion in the event that contraception should fail."125
Despite this strong language, Casey expresses considerable ambivalence
about the autonomous woman. The opinion confronts the mother arche-
type at the same time as it reinforces the stigma imposed on women who
choose to terminate pregnancies:
The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxie-
ties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she must
bear.... Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State
to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role,
however dominant that vision has been in the course of our his-
tory and our culture. The destiny of the woman must be shaped
to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual impera-
tives and her place in society.126
The Court describes mother as the noble human; "not-mother" is justified
only because she may "suffer" in gestation and childbirth. The narrative of
autonomy therefore is less a positive acknowledgement of a woman choos-
ing "not-mother" than an expression of deference to those women who re-
fuse to sacrifice their bodies and their destinies. But even that deference is
double-edged, for "not-mother" is, by implication, selfish and ignoble.
Thus, while not mandating the mother role, the Court suggests that "not-
mother" is deficient: "That these sacrifices have from the beginning of the
human race been endured by woman with a pride that ennobles her in the
124. Casey, 505 U.S. at 856.
125. Casey, 505 U.S. at 856.
126. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
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eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot alone be
grounds for the State to insist she make the sacrifice."127
Other passages present similar tension. In examining the scope of lib-
erty, the Court recognizes that for some, a pregnant woman is inevitably
mother: "One view is based on such reverence for the wonder of creation
that any pregnancy ought to be welcomed and carried to full term no mat-
ter how difficult it will be to provide for the child and ensure its well-
being."128 An alternative perspective, the Court acknowledges "is that the
inability to provide for the nurture and care of the infant is a cruelty to the
child and an anguish to the parent . . . ."129 Roe, the joint opinion con-
cludes, protects the woman's liberty to decide between these views. As the
Court describes it, Casey reaffirms a pregnant woman's right either to em-
brace motherhood or to recognize her "inability" to be a mother.
This juxtaposition of conflicting narratives, a veritable verbal wink,
undermines the persuasive value of the Court's otherwise powerful argu-
ment in support of woman's autonomy. But the Casey narrative of moral
authority is compromised primarily by the constitutional standard em-
ployed by the Court. The undue burden standard, displacing the strict scru-
tiny standard of Roe, belies the very moral authority the Court purports to
respect. 130
E. Mommie Dearest
By playing the mother narrative against the principles of liberty and
equality that support reproductive autonomy, Casey presents two familiar
archetypes, the good mother and the bad mother. The good mother, the
ennobled woman, as Casey constructs her, is the woman who carries her
pregnancy to term; she has "endured" the physical and emotional hardships
"with . . . pride."1s The woman who chooses to end her pregnancy may
also be assigned the nomenclature of mother, particularly in those opinions
hostile to constitutional protection of choice.132 She is, by implication, the
bad mother, for only a bad mother would terminate the life inside her.
Here, the obvious should be stated, namely that while some women
seeking abortions may view themselves as mother, particularly women con-
fronting serious health risks or fetal abnormalities, most women do not.
Often the Court's use of mother tracks the language of the statutes being
127. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
128. Casey, 505 U.S. at 853.
129. Casey, 505 U.S. at 853.
130. See infia notes 199-209 and accompanying text.
131. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
132. Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124, 141-43, 147-48, 153, 159-161 (2007).
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challenged, but not always.' 1 The Court's language is inconsistent, some-
times referring both to mother and woman in the same opinion. These dual
references may be accidental, but it seems unlikely that the Justices are una-
ware of the potential impact of the language they choose, particularly in
controversial decisions where every sentence is parsed for clues to unresolved
issues.
In Casey, for example, the joint opinion referred to "woman" more
than one hundred times and to "mother" only nine, three of which were
quotes from Danforth.134 The Court's strongest supporters of choice, Jus-
tices Blackmun and Stevens overwhelmingly discussed abortion in terms of
woman rather than mother. Justice Blackmun used the term woman sixty-
five times, mother eight, primarily when quoting language in other cases.1 35
Justice Stevens referenced the woman thirty-five times, mother only
twice. 3 6 Similarly, Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent in Carhart II, used the
term woman thirty-nine times.13 7 Only twice, when citing quotes, did she
use mother.138 By contrast, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Carhart I, describ-
ing the rights and interests at stake, referred to mother fifteen times, woman
twenty-six.1 3 9
Carhart IIs interchange of woman and mother implies parallel identi-
ties. By identifying woman as mother, the Court imposes judgment on her
decision to abort. For the good mother, pregnancy and childbearing are
profoundly fulfilling, for "[riespect for human life finds an ultimate expres-
sion in the bond of love the mother has for her child."140 The bad mother
violates this "ultimate expression" of "respect for human life" by seeking to
end "the bond of love the mother has for her child."14 1 This moral repug-
nance toward the woman, regardless of her reasons for seeking an abortion,
is evident in other passages. It is the "expectant mother" who seeks a late-
term abortion, and, the state is justified in warning her of "the conse-
quences that follow from a decision to elect a later-term abortion." 42 The
133. Compare Justice Blackmun's reference to the language of the Texas statute referring
to "mother" with his later description of the statute as permitting abortions "neces-
sary to preserve the pregnant woman's life." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 119, 129
(1973).
134. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
135. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
136. Casey, 505 U.S. at 912-22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
137. Carhart II at 169-171.
138. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 184-85 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 891, and Bradwell v. State,
16 Wall. 130, 141, 21 L.Ed. 442 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring)).
139. Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124.
140. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 159.
141. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 159.
142. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 160.
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good mother, once she learns how her child will be "killed" may choose not
to have an abortion. i OThe bad mother who proceeds with the abortion is
likely to suffer moral anguish, for "a mother" may come to "regret her
choice" and must "struggle with grief' when she learns what she did to her
"child."' 4 4 The Court's tendency to pair the term mother with the nomen-
clature "child," discussed infra, further reinforces the narrative of woman as
inevitable mother. The inevitable mother may not choose to act in her own
interests as a woman; her choice is whether to be a good mother or a bad
mother.
The dissent excoriates the moralizing of the majority as "an antiabor-
tion shibboleth for which it concededly has no reliable evidence;" one that is
based on "ancient notions about women's place in the family and under the
Constitution" that have "long since been discredited."' 45 Debunking the
"good mother" construct, Justice Ginsburg pointedly notes, quoting the
majority: "Notwithstanding the 'bond of love' women often have with their
children . . . not all pregnancies, this Court has recognized, are wanted, or
even the product of consensual activity."' 4 6
Not surprisingly, the good mother constructed by the Court in Car-
hart II and other cases often is disassociated from the actual decision to seek
an abortion. Responsibility for the choice may be attributed to "woman" or
to third parties, but not to the mother, who is more frequently seen as the
abortion recipient. In Carhart II, it is "mother" who has a bond of love with
her "child" and "mother" who "comes to regret her choice," but it is
"woman" who actually makes the choice.147
This depiction of mother as abortion recipient evokes traditional ste-
reotypes of woman as passive object. The good mother does not choose
abortion, and, historically, the woman has not been criminally liable for
abortion: "[Parties] claim that most state laws were designed solely to pro-
tect the woman . . . [and thus] the pregnant woman herself could not be
prosecuted for self-abortion or for cooperating in an abortion performed
upon her by another."' 4 8 One of the core principles of abortion jurispru-
dence, until Carhart II, required exceptions from abortion restrictions where
necessary to protect the life or health of the woman. Although the Court
may discuss these exceptions in relation to woman as well as mother, it
143. Carbart II, 550 U.S. at 159-60.
144. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 159.
145. Carbart II, 550 U.S. at 183-185 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
146. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 184 n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
147. Carbart II, 550 U.S. at 159. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 137-47, 153
(1973) (using "mother" to refer to the health of the woman and "woman" to refer to
the decisionmaker).
148. Roe, 410 U.S. at 151.
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frequently employs the term mother as someone whose life or health needs
protection by third parties. Both the state and the medical profession are
charged with protecting the life and health of the "mother."14 9
The narrative of woman as mother marries powerful historical and
cultural associations with purportedly neutral constitutional analysis. This
narrative takes on even greater visibility when coupled with an examination
of the terminology used by the Court to describe prenatal life.
III. LIFE As WE KNOW IT
The language used by the Court to describe prenatal life, like the lan-
guage describing the abortion seeker, varies considerably. The variations
from opinion to opinion suggest moral as well as legal judgments about
abortion. It is important to examine this language for what it reveals about
the different perspectives on prenatal life and, ultimately, about the woman
who seeks an abortion. The pairing of the dual constructs of abortion seeker
and prenatal life, with woman/fetus and mother/child representing opposite
ends of the spectrum, completes the narratives about women. The Court
often opts to use the terms woman and fetus together when acknowledging
constitutional protection of the right to choose.15o By contrast, the mother/
child pairing typically appears when the Court is emphasizing protection of
prenatal life.151 The mother/child terminology contributes to abortion
stigma by furthering the narrative of the bad mother. The personification of
the fetus also generates abortion stigma by equating abortion with murder.
A. Biology
The description of prenatal life as a stage of biological development
correlates most frequently with discussion of abortion as a medical proce-
dure. The use of scientific terms lends neutrality to the Court's analysis,
unlike the politically charged and biologically inaccurate description of pre-
149. See, e.g., Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 160 ("The State's interest in respect for life is
advanced by the dialogue that better informs the political and legal systems, the
medical profession, expectant mothers, and society as a whole of the consequences
that follow from a decision to elect a late-term abortion."); Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S 833, 879 (1992) ("We also reaffirm Roe's holding that 'the
State ... may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health
of the mother."'); Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 ("With respect to the State's important and
legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the 'compelling' point, in the light of
present medical knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester.").
150. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 873.
151. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 159-60.
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natal life as a "child."152 Thus, it is not surprising that the Court's descrip-
tion of prenatal life as biology also pairs with the narrative of woman as
autonomous being, not as mother.153
The Court's use of the term "fetus" typically occurs where the empha-
sis is on the distinction between prenatal life and a legal "person."' Roe, of
course, specifically held that a fetus is not a "person" within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 15 5 Similarly, Justice Stevens, in Thornburgh,
explains, "there is a fundamental and well-recognized difference between a
fetus and a human being."' 5 6 In Roe, the Court referred to the differences
between a "quick" and "unquickened fetus" when describing the history of
abortion regulation.157 Fetus also is the preferred term used by the Court
when defining viability or the constitutional consequences of viability.158
Thus, it is "fetal viability" that delineates the point at which the state's
interests may prevail over those of the woman.
This terminology, along with other references to biological stages,
such as "potential life of an embryo," demarcates the pre-viable fetus from
the human person. The Court's use of the term fetus defuses the construct
of the conflict of rights invoked when prenatal life is described as a "child."
The constitutional protection given the woman's right to choose matches
best with an explanation that juxtaposes a biological process with the rights
and interests of a born human. Thus, it is not surprising that as the Court
has become more hostile to the right to choose, the preferred description of
prenatal life has moved from the scientific neutrality associated with the
term fetus and been replaced with more politically charged nomenclature
for prenatal life.
152. See infra notes 152-172 and accompanying text.
153. Carbart II, 550 U.S. at 145-146.
154. A fetus is the stage of development dating from eight weeks after conception. The
Court rarely uses the term "embryo." It typically associates embryo, accurately, with
early development (an embryo is "the young of a viviparous animal, especially of a
mammal, in the early stages of development within the womb, in humans up to the
end of the second month." Embryo Definition, DicrioNARY.coM UNABRIDGED,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/embryo (last visited Oct. 31, 2012). Occa-
sionally the Court interchanges the use of embryo and fetus, blurring the develop-
mental distinctions. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 150 ("Only when the life of the
pregnant mother herself is at stake, balanced against the life she carries within her,
should the interest of the embryo or fetus not prevail.").
155. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.
156. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 778-79
(1986).
157. Roe, 410 U.S. at 132-38.
158. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992).
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B. Beyond Biology
At times, Justices on both sides of the debate describe prenatal life in
language that is non-scientific and politically charged. Justice Stevens, in his
dissent in Webster, quotes from St. Thomas Aquinas when he describes pre-
natal life before "sensation and movement" as a "seed."' 5 9 Stevens argues
that the preamble to the Missouri statute violates the First Amendment by
stating that life begins at conception: "a woman's constitutionally protected
liberty encompasses the right to act on her own belief that - to paraphrase
St. Thomas Aquinas - until a seed has acquired the powers of sensation and
movement, the life of a human being has not yet begun."' 6 0
More typically, and certainly more recently, the references to prenatal
life in political terms are found in those opinions hostile to a woman's right
to choose. The use of the terms "child" or the "unborn" elevates prenatal
life to the equivalent of a born human. This terminology alone goes a long
way toward constructing a narrative of rights and protections afforded to
prenatal life. Describing prenatal life as the unborn or as a child is not a new
phenomenon in the Court's opinions. Roe claimed that ancient Greek and
Roman law provided "little protection to the unborn."' 6' In describing the
evolution of the American Medical Association's position on abortion, the
Court quoted from an 1859 AMA report criticizing laws that fail to respect
"the independent and actual existence of the child before birth, as a living
being."162 After Roe, the Court began to entertain challenges to laws restrict-
ing abortion that frequently described prenatal life as the "unborn child."'16
Over time, the Court began to incorporate the language of these statutes
and similar language used in anti-choice briefs submitted to the Court.' 64
Casey marks the ascendancy of the state's interest in protecting prena-
tal life as demonstrated rhetorically by the Court's increasing use of the
term "unborn."'16  Unlike the biological terms of fetus and embryo, the un-
159. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 567-69 (1989) (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
160. Webster, 492 U.S. at 572. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
161. Roe, 410 U.S. at 130.
162. Roe, 410 U.S. at 141-42.
163. See, e.g., Webster, 492 U.S. at 500 n.1 (citing Mo. REv. STAT. %§ 1.205.1(1)-(2),
§1.205.2 (1986)).
164. See, e.g., Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) ("[Ilit seems unexceptionable to con-
clude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once
created and sustained.") (citing Brief for Sandra Cano et al. as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioner, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (No. 05-380) (2006
WL 1436684)).
165. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (using the term un-
born slightly more often than the term fetus). Cf Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (referring to
prenatal life as a fetus more than twice as frequently as using the term unborn).
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born is a construct. Unborn evokes the image of fully formed life and per-
sonhood that differs from a born person only by a biological technicality. As
constructed by the Court, the unborn has an identity and interests separate
from the pregnant woman. As Casey describes, "[t] he woman's liberty is not
so unlimited, however, that from the outset the State cannot show its con-
cern for the life of the unborn."' 66
The shift in Casey to recognizing the interest of the state in protecting
prenatal life throughout the pregnancy, discussed infra, pits the pregnant
woman against the state from the time of conception. Defining prenatal life
as the unborn enhances the moral authority of the state to engage in this
conflict. As protector of this technically-not-born person, the state "may
express profound respect for the life of the unborn."' 67 The embodiment of
prenatal life as the unborn, from the moment of conception, reinforces the
woman as mother narrative. It characterizes the pregnancy not as a process
but as a more or less static condition that sustains a formed life until it can
be born. The pregnant woman thus becomes a carrier of a technically-not-
born person. As carrier of the unborn, she is expected to be caretaker, to
recognize the otherness of the life within.
The narrative of prenatal life as the unborn takes on heightened au-
thority when "unborn" joins with "child." The Court's references to the
unborn child complete the picture of prenatal life as independent being, a
temporary resident of the womb who is waiting to be born. Justice Scalia
typically describes prenatal life as a child: "The method of killing a human
child-one cannot even accurately say an entirely unborn human child-
proscribed by this statute is so horrible that the most clinical description of
it evokes a shudder of revulsion."16 8 Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court
in Carhart II repeatedly uses the term unborn child, in both routine prose,
"Abortion methods vary depending ... on the term[s] of the pregnancy and
the resulting stage of the unborn child's development," and in highly
charged descriptions of abortion, ". . . that she allowed a doctor to pierce
the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn child."'16
Justice Kennedy at times joins the terms fetus and child, identifying prenatal
life as "the fetus that may become a child."17 0 This language, while recogniz-
ing the biological stage of development and the biological process, ulti-
mately draws its impact from the term child by the linkage of biology with
an image of a born child. The depiction of prenatal life as a child creates the
strongest narrative for woman as inevitable mother. This narrative is explic-
166. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869.
167. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
168. Carbart 1, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
169. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 134, 160.
170. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 146, 158.
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itly evoked by Justice Kennedy's description of pregnancy, "Respect for
human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the mother has
for her child."'7 1 He goes on to describe the regret women may feel if they
choose to "abort the infant life they once created and sustained."172
The construction of prenatal life as child or the unborn transforms the
fetus into an identity that readers visualize as akin to born humans. And this
yet unborn child is "sustained" by the love of her mother. In the language of
the Court it is this identity, and this relationship, that a woman seeking an
abortion chooses to terminate. It is this very violation of the mother-child
relationship that is central to the generation of abortion stigma.
Quite independent of the mother/child narrative, the personification
of the fetus advances abortion stigma in other ways. First, the description of
prenatal life as a child gives a false impression of the independence of the
fetus from the woman, her body, and her life. Identifying the fetus as a
child diminishes the presence of the woman and her moral authority in
favor of a moral imperative to protect the "child." Further, the personifica-
tion of the fetus functions to associate abortion with murder.
The language employed by the Court is not the sole generator of abor-
tion stigma, however. We must also examine the Court's abortion jurispru-
dence to see how it reinforces the Court's rhetoric.
IV. LOST IN TRANsLATION
Language is a powerful generator and reinforcer of abortion stigma.
But legal standards also serve similar functions. An assessment of abortion
stigma in the Court's abortion jurisprudence must be informed by the rela-
tionship between the abortion narratives in the opinions and the constitu-
tional standard joined with these narratives. The standards articulated in
Roe and Casey, the two landmarks of abortion jurisprudence, do not neces-
sarily correlate to the abortion narratives invoked in each decision. In fact,
the narratives are in tension with the constitutional parameters set for regu-
lating abortion. For example, the Court's original narrative, constructed in
Roe, presents the woman as primarily a passive recipient of medical judg-
ment. This narrative is paired, however, with a constitutional standard
highly protective of women's autonomy. By contrast, the Casey narrative
generally may be highly supportive of women's reproductive self-determina-
tion, but it is coupled with a standard that weakens these constitutional
values. A brief comparison of Roe and Casey highlights the impact of legal
standards on abortion stigma.
171. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 159.




Roe grounded the right to choose in a right of privacy protected by the
liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 3 Privacy, of course, is not
explicit in the constitutional text. The right of privacy, the Court explained,
derived from a long line of cases protecting the right of the individual to be
free from unwarranted government intrusion into significant personal deci-
sions.' 74 These cases focused particularly on situations where the govern-
ment intruded into matters relating to marriage, procreation, and family
relationships.15 The Roe Court concluded that the right of privacy,
grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment's "concept of personal liberty," is
"broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to termi-
nate her pregnancy."' 76
The Court did not analyze why the right of privacy included the right
to choose other than to list several potential adverse effects of compelled
pregnancy. 77 The Court did describe the "detriment" that state denial of
access to abortion imposed on a pregnant woman. 78 That detriment in-
cluded the potential for physical and psychological harm.17  The Court
twice referred to the possible "distress" imposed, a term that suggests emo-
tional vulnerability.18 0 The distress described by the Court appears to be
primarily medical. The Court explains that "specific and direct harm medi-
cally diagnosable" may be involved.""1 It describes the likely imminence of
"psychological harm" where access to abortion is prohibited and suggests,
"Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care." 82
Thus, despite the statement by the Court suggesting that broad princi-
ples of personal liberty supported the right to choose, Roe described the
essence of the right in far narrower medical terms. This characterization
dovetails with the Court's extensive explanation of the medical history of
abortion regulation earlier in the opinion.' 83 The Court's focus on the med-
ical implications of compelled pregnancy is even more apparent when the
173. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-55 (1973).
174. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-55.
175. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-55.
176. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
177. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
178. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
179. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
180. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
181. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
182. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
183. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (discussing ancient approaches to abortion law as well as
those of the common law, English statutory law, and American law).
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Court rejects an argument that the right to choose involves an unlimited
right to control one's body.18'
The right to choose may be grounded in privacy, but as early as Roe,
the Court was already separating abortion from other privacy rights. After
initially describing protection of the right to choose as consistent with the
line of cases protecting marital and family privacy, the Court disavows this
linkage by claiming that the right to choose "is inherently different from
marital intimacy, or bedroom possession of obscene material, or marriage,
or procreation, or education." 85 The inherent difference is the presence of
prenatal life in the form of an embryo and, later, a fetus.186 This difference
substantially restricts the meaning of the right to choose. As the Court de-
scribes the right, "the pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy."187
The Court's willingness to define the abortion decision as a battle for
control of the woman's womb ultimately demonstrates the limited concep-
tion of the right articulated in Roe. The Roe analysis does not view the right
to choose as a constitutionally necessary manifestation of the self-determina-
tion and equality rights of women. To the contrary, Roe pays scant attention
to the decision-making authority of women, or to the relationship between
reproductive self-determination and the ability of women to participate
equally in the public sphere.
This medically-based standard, resting more on the authority of the
physician and the state than on the decision-making authority of the
woman, furthers the narratives of woman as passive and lacking intellectual
and emotional judgment. The medical model also served to avoid questions
relating to the moral authority of women. Deeply entrenched skepticism of
women's authority may have led the Court to focus this seminal and con-
troversial decision on firmer historical ground. Whatever the reason, the
medical model of abortion decision-making did little to dispel the view that
a woman's decision on whether to have an abortion should be directed by
her physician or by the state.
But if the meaning of the right to choose depicted by the Roe Court
lies primarily in protecting the right of a woman to be free from the medical
consequences of compelled pregnancy, the constitutional standard em-
ployed by the Court served a far more generous function. The trimester
analysis adopted in Roe left the woman generally unfettered by state interfer-
ence during the first trimester of pregnancy and subject only to laws in-
tended to protect maternal health during the second trimester. It was not
184. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
185. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
186. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
187. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
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until viability that an interest other than maternal health justified regula-
tion. At viability, the state could regulate to protect prenatal life, including
banning abortions as long as exceptions were made to protect the life or
health of the woman.188
By applying strict scrutiny to laws regulating abortion, the Court pro-
tected the autonomy and decision-making authority of the woman, gener-
ally, up until viability. Even if this authority was portrayed as the physician's
medical judgment, in reality the choice of the woman was substantially pro-
tected from state interference prior to viability.189 In a series of decisions
following Roe, the Court strictly scrutinized regulations purporting to pro-
tect maternal health, invalidating twenty-four-hour waiting periods and in-
trusive informed consent requirements because they were not narrowly
tailored to real health concerns.19 o
The irony of Roe is that the constitutional parameters set by the Court
for regulating abortion provide far greater protection of women's self-deter-
mination and autonomy than could be discerned simply from reading the
Court's minimalist description of the right to choose. The trimester ap-
proach carved out a period of autonomous decision-making that required
the state to abstain from interfering with the woman's decision. The adop-
tion of strict scrutiny as the standard for reviewing abortion regulation en-
sured the Court would aggressively protect this autonomy.
188. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164. The trimester approach adopted in Roe recognized that the
state has a legitimate interest in protecting maternal health throughout the preg-
nancy. This interest becomes compelling at the end of the first trimester, when
health risks from abortion may equal or surpass those from childbirth. At this point,
the state could reasonably regulate to protect maternal health.
189. The Court consistently failed, however, to protect the abortion decisions of women
dependent on public funds. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977); Beal v.
Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 447 n.15 (1977) (citing Maher, 432 U.S. at 482); Poelker v.
Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (citing Maher, 432 U.S. 464). See also Webster v. Reprod.
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 491-92, 509-11 (1989).
190. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71-72 (1976);
Akron I, 462 U.S. 416, 442 (1982); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759 (1986). See also Greenhouse, supra note 50 (dis-
cussing how the Court's discourse began to include liberty interests, the author notes
that "Justice Blackmun's files from [Thornburgh] contain an article ... noting the
'tension between the Court's systematic deference to the physician and the conflict-
ing notion . . . that the woman has at stake a privacy right independent of and
entitled to greater constitutional protection than the interests of her doctor'" (citing
Susan Frelich Appleton, Doctors, Patients, and the Constitution: A Theoretical Analysis
of the Physician's Role in "Private Reproductive Decisions," 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 183,
218-19 (1985))).
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B. Casey
Nineteen years later, the Court revisited the controversial analysis of
Roe.'9 ' This time the Court had a great deal more to say about the right to
choose. The joint opinion authored by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter, opens with a clear statement of the constitutional value at stake:
"Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."92 The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State "shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."'9 As the
Court makes clear, "the controlling word in the cases before us is 'lib-
erty.'"9 4 Indeed, the Court recognizes "the urgent claims of the woman to
retain the ultimate control over her destiny and her body [are] claims im-
plicit in the meaning of liberty."'95
These are grand words, indeed, and the joint opinion, in many ways,
embodies the narrative of woman as the capable and autonomous decision
maker. But in Casey, the Court rejects strict scrutiny of laws regulating abor-
tion and replaces it with the undue burden test, inviting additional restric-
tions on abortion and access to abortion services. 196 The undue burden test
not only changes the level of scrutiny, it also shifts the burden from the state
to the plaintiff, making it more difficult and costly for plaintiffs to pre-
vail.197 The strict scrutiny standard of Roe signified the Court's skepticism
of state regulation of abortion. Casey, by contrast, relocates the Court's
skepticism from state to woman by requiring the plaintiff to prove undue
burden. With this test of diminishing protection for woman's autonomy
comes the Court's clear message that one of the primary errors of the Roe
framework was the lack of weight given to the state's interest in protecting
prenatal life throughout the pregnancy.' 98
The undue burden test of Casey thus embodies conflicting narratives
about women and abortion. The Court describes an undue burden as one
191. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
192. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
193. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
194. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. The Court's emphasis is significant. In embracing liberty as
the constitutional value underlying choice, the Court omits any reference to the right
to privacy that formed the core of the Roe analysis. It offers no explanation as to why
liberty, rather than privacy, is now the operative constitutional value. The Court
instead obscures the shift in terminology, describing the line of cases protecting re-
productive choice in contraception as matters central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment without mentioning the right of privacy. Casey's point, im-
plicit rather than explicit, is that liberty subsumes privacy.
195. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869.
196. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878-79.
197. Compare Casey, 505 U.S. at 878-79, with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156 (1973).
198. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869, 872-73.
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that, by purpose or effect, places a substantial obstacle before a woman seek-
ing abortion.' 9 ' Casey overrules prior decisions invalidating twenty-four-
hour waiting periods and restrictive informed consent requirements. 200 In
doing so, the Court upholds Pennsylvania's twenty-four-hour waiting pe-
riod and informed consent procedures, despite evidence that these restric-
tions impose economic hardship and emotional stress on women seeking
abortions.201 The joint opinion acknowledges the increased costs and delay
imposed by the laws but ultimately concludes: "a state measure designed to
persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably
related to that goal."202
The potential for conflict between the undue burden standard and
Casey's encouragement of laws designed to deter women from abortions is
problematic. Casey provides little guidance for distinguishing permissible
laws intended to deter women from abortions from impermissible laws that
pose a substantial obstacle. Even more problematically, the Court's accept-
ance of laws designed to deter women from choosing abortion is inconsis-
tent with its description of an undue burden as a law that by purpose or
effect constitutes a substantial obstacle to the right to choose. 203 The impact
of Casey has been to encourage regulations that impede women's access to
reproductive health services in furtherance of the state's interest in deterring
abortions. 2 04
Casey has been further undermined by the paternalistic opinion in
Carhart I,205 which shows so little respect for the concerns of the woman as
to only mention her in the context of how she needs protection from her
199. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869, 872-73.
200. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881-82 ("To the extent Akron land Thornburgh find a constitu-
tional violation when the government requires, as it does here, the giving of truthful,
nonmisleading information about the nature of the procedure, the attendant health
risks and those of childbirth, and the 'probable gestational age' of the fetus, those
cases go too far. . . ."); Id. at 887 (declining to consider facial challenge to twenty-
four-hour waiting period).
201. Casey, 505 U.S. at 885-87. See also id. at 919 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
202. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
203. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
204. See, e.g., Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Serv. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th
Cit. 2012) (holding that regulations mandating performance and viewing of ultra-
sound were not unconstitutional); Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d.
157 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that regulations imposing licensing and operational
requirements for physicians' offices and medical clinics performing at least five first-
trimester abortions monthly were constitutional).
205. Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
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own decisions.206 As Carhart II demonstrates, the Casey standard elevates
the interests of the state and diminishes the authority of the woman. 20 7 This
diminution finds expression in Carhart II through two recurring portrayals:
woman as vulnerable and incompetent and woman as inevitable mother.208
Roe paired a narrative of the passive woman with robust constitutional
protection for her assertion of reproductive autonomy. In Roe, narratives of
dependency reinforced abortion stigma, but this stigma was counterbal-
anced in large part by a legal standard that expressed dignity and authority.
Casey serves as the mirror image of Roe, coupling an eloquent narrative of
the equality and liberty interests of women with a legal standard that under-
mines the principles lauded by the Court. In Casey, abortion stigma is gen-
erated by the undue burden standard, a standard that authorizes the state to
question and meddle with a woman's decision to seek an abortion. Casey
sets the stage for the opinion in Carhart H. The narrative of the autono-
mous woman, mere dicta, disappears. What is left is the legal standard that
invites government control and the corresponding narratives of women as
objects of control.209 Carhart II exemplifies the perfect marriage of language
and law that both generates and reinforces abortion stigma.
V. UNFORGIVEN
Part I defined abortion stigma as a social construct that depicts abor-
tion as deviant and marks the woman who seeks an abortion as failing to
meet the prescribed ideals of womanhood. If we apply the components of
stigma generation to the Court's treatment of abortion and women who
seek abortions, we can see specifically how the Court mediates abortion
stigma. To summarize, stigma is generated through a process of labeling,
stereotyping, separation, and loss of status. 2t0 These components operate
through power inequities that permit the construction of stereotypes and
the consequences of disapproval or discrimination.211 Thus, the question
206. Discussed infa, nn. 231-234 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, The New
Politics ofAbortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 3
U. ILL. L. REv. 991, nn.14 2-43 (2007).
207. A central premise of the opinion was that the Court's precedents after Roe had "un-
dervalue[d] the State's interest in potential life." Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 157 (quot-
ing Casey, 505. U.S. at 873).
208. Carhart II 550 U.S. at 159-60.
209. Carbart II, 550 U.S. at 159-60 (explaining how the woman is unlikely to be well-
informed about the late-term abortion procedure and approving the state's interest
in "ensuring so grave a choice is well-informed.").




becomes whether the Court's abortion jurisprudence functions to ostracize
the abortion procedure and the woman who seeks an abortion.
Much of human experience involves differentiation and labeling. But
some differentiation has significant social power, particularly distinctions
based on race and gender. Labeling and stereotyping based on these charac-
teristics may be automatic and preconscious. 2 12 The stereotypes displayed in
the abortion cases are not surprising; until Casey, the Court showed little
interest in tackling the gender stereotypes at the heart of much abortion
regulation.213 Casey acknowledges the gender issues but fails to employ a
constitutional standard with enough teeth to invalidate laws based on gen-
der stereotyping.
The most obvious cultural stereotypes appear in cases where the Court
employs narratives that portray women as flawed decision makers and inevi-
table mothers. As discussed in Parts II and III, these narratives generate
abortion stigma primarily through language, a powerful mediator of moral-
ity.2 14 The vocabulary employed by the Court reinforces negative stereo-
types about abortion and women. These stereotypes mark the woman who
seeks an abortion as aberrant; her judgment is morally suspect because she
seeks, even temporarily, to avoid the role of mother.
As discussed in Part IV, abortion stigma is also produced through con-
stitutional standards and analysis, from Roe to Carbart II, that give credence
to the view of woman as passive object who needs the direction of physician
and state to make sound decisions. Other elements of the Court's abortion
jurisprudence also contribute to the generation of abortion stigma. How the
Court frames the discourse about abortion and the woman who seeks an
abortion combines powerfully with the Court's terminology to reinforce
negative stereotypes.
Oversimplification of complex characteristics and situations is essen-
tial to differentiation and stereotyping. 2 15 A woman's decision to terminate
a pregnancy is likely to involve complex personal, social, and economic con-
siderations. The Court's portrayal of both the abortion procedure and the
woman tends, however, to oversimplify the issues and context involved.
The Court characterizes abortion as an atypical medical procedure.
Rather than recognize its presence on the spectrum of reproductive health
212. Id. at 369.
213. Abrams, supra note 59, at 488-89.
214. Link and Phelan describe the importance of language, labeling, and stereotyping by
reference to an experiment testing the subjects' responses to a vignette. Half of the
subjects were told the vignette involved former mental patients; the other half be-
lieved the vignette concerned former back-pain patients. The responses differed dra-
matically depending upon the labeling. Link & Phelan, supra note 38, at 369.
215. Id.
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care, the Court repeatedly distinguishes abortion from other reproductive
decisions.216 Significantly, the abortion cases fail to acknowledge the fre-
quency of abortion in society. Nearly half of the pregnancies in the United
States are unintended. Forty percent of these unintended pregnancies will be
terminated by abortion.217 The abortion cases, however, consistently choose
to highlight the controversy surrounding abortion rather than its frequency.
The Court thus differentiates abortion from the norm by portraying it as sui
generis. This differentiation begins with Roe, where the Court examined in
detail the moral, philosophical, and religious aspects of abortion but only
briefly acknowledged that during the first trimester, abortion typically in-
volves less medical risk to the woman than pregnancy. 218 Differentiation
continues throughout the Court's abortion decisions, including in Casey,
where the Court emphasized, "Men and women of good conscience can
disagree, and we suppose some always shall disagree, about the profound
moral and spiritual implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its ear-
liest stage." 2 19 This depiction of abortion as uncommon is consistent with
widespread (and inaccurate) cultural attitudes toward abortion.220
Since Casey, the Court has validated laws that distinguish abortion
from other medical procedures. Under the strict scrutiny standard of Roe the
Court struck down laws mandating twenty-four-hour waiting periods and
intrusive informed consent requirements. 22 1 The Court rejected these re-
strictions largely because it found no compelling justification for treating
abortion differently from other medical procedures.222 Casey and Carhart II,
by contrast, defer to the legislative treatment of abortion as unique. Casey,
by overruling Akron land Thornburgh and upholding informed consent and
waiting period restrictions that target only abortion, permits abortion to be
isolated as an atypical procedure.223 In Carbart II the Court accepts the
argument that the contemplation of a late-term abortion is sufficient justifi-
cation for government interference with the doctor-patient relationship.224
216. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
217. GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States (Aug.
2011), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb-induced_abortion.html.
218. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149-50.
219. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.
220. Studies show that underreporting of abortion is substantial and occurs for complex
cultural reasons. J. Richard Udry et al., A Medical Record Linkage Analysis ofAbortion
Underreporting, 28 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 229 (1996), available at http://
www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/2822896.html.
221. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 764
(1986); Akron I, 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983).
222. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 783; Akron I, 462 U.S. at 427.
223. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
224. Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007).
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The association of abortion with uncommonness readily evokes the
taint of questionable morality. Casey sends highly mixed messages about the
morality of abortion. It defends the constitutional basis for the right to
choose yet states unequivocally, "Some of us as individuals find abortion
offensive to our most basic principles of morality."225 This statement of
moral disgust is couched in terms of constitutional imperative because
moral approbation "cannot control our decision."226 The Court, reluctantly,
must subvert morality to duty: "Our obligation is to define the liberty of all,
not to mandate our own moral code."227 Thus, the Court sets liberty apart
from morality. In doing so, it implies that abortion is immoral but must be
tolerated because of the generosity of our constitutional tradition. Carhart II
goes further, treating abortion as abhorrent. The case involves only late-
term abortions, but the Court's disgust with abortion is more generalized.
Carhart I engages in graphic and detailed descriptions of late-term abor-
tions that simultaneously personalize the fetus and vilify the physician.228
The dominance of this imagery in the opinion appears excessive when one
considers that only 10-15% of abortions occur after the first trimester. The
extensive depictions of fetal body parts and surgical mutilations convey re-
vulsion with abortion in general, not just late-term.
The Court's decision to allow legislatures to eliminate the discretion
of physicians to act in the best health interests of women marks abortion as
225. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.
226. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.
227. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.
228. [T]he surgeon takes a pair of blunt curved Metzenbaum scissors in
the right hand. He carefully advances the tip, curved down, along the spine
and under his middle finger until he feels it contact the base of the skull
under the tip of his middle Finger. [T]he surgeon then forces the scissors
into the base of the skull or into the foramen magnum. Having safely en-
tered the skull, he spreads the scissors to enlarge the opening. The surgeon
removes the scissors and introduces a suction catheter into this hole and
evacuates the skull contents.
Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 138.
[The doctor] went in with forceps and grabbed the baby's legs and pulled
them down into the birth canal. Then he delivered the baby's body and the
arms-everything but the head. The doctor kept the head right inside the
uterus . . . . The baby's little fingers were clasping and unclasping, and his
little feet were kicking. Then the doctor stuck the scissors in the back of his
head, and the baby's arms jerked out, like a startle reaction, like a flinch,
like a baby does when he thinks he is going to fall. The doctor opened up
the scissors, stuck a high-powered suction tube into the opening, and
sucked the baby's brains out. Now the baby went completely limp . . . He
cut the umbilical cord and delivered the placenta. He threw the baby in a
pan, along with the placenta and the instruments he had just used.
Carbart II, 550 U.S. at 138-39.
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separate from, and inferior to, traditional medical practice. The Court justi-
fies this variance by emphasizing that the legislature should have the author-
ity to address the "moral concerns" at issue. 2 29 The marginalization of
abortion also occurs through the Court's repeated description of physicians
who perform the procedure as "abortion doctors," isolating these practition-
ers from mainstream medicine.230 In fact, the entire "woman-centered" pro-
tectionist analysis central to Carhart II functions to establish abortion as a
"catastrophic" experience. 231
Once the abortion procedure is deemed aberrant, it is predictable that
women who seek the procedure will be considered deviant. Here is where
the narratives about women constructed by the Court further negative ste-
reotypes. The vulnerable and passive patient described in Roe is not an ap-
pealing figure, nor is she a figure with whom most modern women would
identify. Casey, once again, sends conflicting signals. It exalts the woman's
right to shape her own destiny but cabins her autonomy. It praises her dig-
nity while suggesting that her choice is immoral. It juxtaposes the stereotype
of the self-sacrificing mother against the independent (i.e., selfish) woman.
Carhart II works on multiple levels to stigmatize the woman. She is
dehumanized and devalued by the Court's continuing depiction of the
woman as body parts. She is patronized by the Court's preoccupation with
the emotional frailties to which it suspects she is prone. The opinion goes to
great length to describe late-term abortion procedures in graphic detail. But
nowhere in the opinion does it mention the fact that many, if not most,
late-term abortions are performed for medical reasons. 232 To the contrary,
Carhart II implies that the "killing" occurs for no particular reason.233 This
characterization of the procedure as a gruesome "abortion on demand" im-
plicitly disparages the morality of the woman who would choose to "kill the
fetus" in this manner. 234 A far more human and empathetic view of the
woman would have emerged if the Court had acknowledged the frequent
medical justifications for late-term abortions. Instead the Court opted for
an inaccurate and unsympathetic portrayal, one that marginalizes the
woman.
229. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 158.
230. CarhartII, 550 U.S. at 138, 144, 154-55, 161, 163.
231. Leslie Cannold, Understanding and Responding to Anti-Choice Women-Centered Strate-
gies, 10:19 REPRODUCTIVEHEALTH MATTERS 171, 174 (2002).
232. Brief of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 10-16, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (Nos.
05-380, 1382), 2006 WL 2867888 at *10-16.
233. See Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 139, 148, 158.
234. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 129, 136, 140 (referencing to "kill the fetus" multiple times).
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Carhart II further marginalizes the woman by associating abortion
with mental instability. The political linkage of abortion with mental illness
has been soundly debunked.235 But the Court cites approvingly the amicus
brief of Sandra Cano, a brief that contains anecdotes, not evidence, from
women who claim that abortion caused them a variety of emotional and
mental problems.236 The Court's assertion that women who abort may suf-
fer regret, "severe depression[,] and loss of esteem" validates traditional ste-
reotypes of woman as emotionally unstable and easily damaged.237
Finally, one of the most powerful negative stereotypes is produced by
the Court's description of abortion as involving "mother" and "child." This
vocabulary suggests infanticide, not abortion, a characterization asserted by
Justice Scalia.238 It also draws on deeply entrenched stereotypes of woman as
mother: mother who finds meaning, and her life's work, through childbear-
ing; mother who sacrifices all, even her life, to protect her children. What
kind of mother would "kill" her child? In fact, married women with infant
children are among those most likely to seek an abortion.239 Six in ten
women who have an abortion already have a child. 240 These women typi-
cally describe a variety of economic and social reasons for seeking abortion,
including the need to care for the children they have.241 But the Court's
abortion narratives fail to acknowledge fully the complex life circumstances
that lead women, including women who are already mothers, to choose
abortion. Instead, the "mother" who populates the Court's opinions is one-
dimensional; she is labeled mother by virtue of her pregnancy, not her
choice, and described as mother-who-terminates-the-life-of-her child. The
Court, by employing this vocabulary, tracks the political discourse that de-
picts women who seek abortions as deviant from the norm, and reinforces
both the negative stereotype and the deviancy.
Once abortion and the woman who seeks an abortion are character-
ized as deviant, separation and loss of status are likely. Underreporting of
235. See, e.g., Susan A. Cohen, Abortion and Mental Health: Myths and Realities, 9:3
GUTTMACHER POLICY REVIEW 8, 9-11 (2006), available at http://www.guttmacher.
org/pubs/gpr/09/3/gpr090308.html.
236. Carbart II, 550 U.S. at 159.
237. Carbart II, 550 U.S. at 159.
238. Carbart I, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The method of killing
a human child . . . .").
239. Kumar et al., supra note 30, at 629.
240. GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, Guttrnacher Video: Abortion in the United States, http://
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the incidence of abortion is well documented.242 The fact that many women
who have abortions keep this information secret from family and friends is a
strong indicator of the social stigma associated with abortion. 243 Abortion is
subject to what some researchers describe as "the implicit rule of secrecy."2 44
Recent data found that two out of three women who have abortions ex-
pected to be stigmatized if they told others about the procedure.24 5 Fifty-
eight percent of women said they needed to keep the procedure secret from
friends and family.246 Women with children are less likely to admit to an
abortion for fear of social exclusion.247 Researchers have argued that this
secrecy in turn sets up a "mutually reinforcing cycle" of regenerating abor-
tion stigma. 248
This stigma reflects social and political efforts to mark the woman
who decides to terminate her pregnancy with shame, not dignity. The data
showing underreporting of abortions and fear of social ostracizing strongly
suggest that for many women, abortion today remains associated with
shame. Shame, not surprisingly, was associated with abortion prior to Roe,
when abortion was criminalized.249 Shaming today is an overt political goal
with the passage of highly intrusive laws that mandate physically invasive
ultrasounds prior to an abortion or question a woman's judgment by forc-
ing her to listen to a demeaning state-designed lecture on why she should
reconsider her decision .250
Since the generation of abortion stigma depends on the depiction of
the woman who seeks to terminate her pregnancy as deviant, as "other"
than the norm, it is easy to see how social inequalities are important to the
creation of stigma. The social and political treatment of abortion makes
clear the power disparities at play. The fact that abortion is a procedure that
only women can undergo inevitably raises questions about social gender
disparities. The political isolation of abortion as a medical procedure has
been accomplished through varied legislation at the state and national level.
This legislation includes restrictions on access to abortion through extended
waiting periods, complex informed consent requirements, and prohibitions
242. GUTMACHER INsTiTUTE, The Limitations of U.S. Statistics on Abortion (Jan. 1997),
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/ibl4.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2012).
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on medication abortions.251 It includes targeted regulation of abortion prov-
iders that subject them to cumbersome and costly restrictions not borne by
other medical providers.252 It also includes exclusion of abortion coverage
from public and private health care. 253
Some of these restrictions impact any woman who seeks an abortion.
But many of the restrictions are particularly burdensome for low-income
women, whose government-funded health care often excludes abortion or
who must find the resources to travel for an abortion and sit out the waiting
periods. Abortion is devolving, in many states, to a procedure available pri-
marily for the well-to-do.254 The Court has long ignored the economic dis-
advantages and access disparities imposed on low-income women by these
regulatory approaches.255
The relationship between the Court's abortion jurisprudence and the
political and social movements concerning abortion is complex and cer-
tainly not linear.256 We can think of landmark constitutional decisions as
part of a judicial-social-political feedback loop. In the most direct sense, the
constitutional standards articulated by the Court form the baseline for sub-
sequent political action. Thus, Casey's undue burden standard invited efforts
to regulate abortion in ways that would not have survived strict scrutiny
under Roe. Carhart I is consistent with the letter, if not the spirit of Casey.
251. For a list of state legislation requiring delays and informed consent, see Mandatory
Delays and Biased Counseling for Women Seeking Abortions, CENTER FOR REPRODUC-
TIVE RIGHTS (Sep. 30, 2010), http://reproductiverights.org/en/project/mandatory-
delays-a nd-biased-counseling-for-women-seeking-abortions. See also, e.g., ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 36-2153 (West 2012) (informed consent); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.
§ 14-02.1-03.5 (West 2011) (regulating medication abortions); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
TIT. 63, 5 1-738.2 (West 2012) (informed consent); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 171.012 (West 2011) (informed consent).
252. Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157 (4th Cit. 2000); see also, e.g.,
10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 14E.0307 (West 2012) (requiring a registered nurse with
post-operative or post-partum care experience be on duty in the clinic whenever
patients are present); 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 14E.0207 (West 2012) (requiring
that abortion clinics must provide eighteen specific components).
253. See Hyde Amendment, originally enacted as Departments of Labor and Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare Appropriation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat.
1418, 1434 (1976) (severely restricting the use of Medicaid funds for abortion).
Section 1303 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act authorizes states to
prohibit abortion coverage by private providers participating in the health insurance
exchanges. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18023 (West 2012).
254. See Rachel Benson Gold, All That's Old Is New Again: The Long Campaign To Per-
suade Women to Forego Abortion, 12 GUTTMACHER POLICY REVIEW (2009), available
at www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/12/2/gprl20219.html.
255. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469-71 (1977). See also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
256. See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under
CaseylCarhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1706-12 (2008).
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The highly deferential application of the undue burden standard in Carhart
II signaled clearly that the Court would be receptive to further requests to
defer to legislative policy on abortion. These legislative policies are likely to
further stigmatize abortion and the woman who seeks an abortion.
Additional messaging on abortion occurs beyond the pronouncement
and application of legal standards. As this article argues, the narratives con-
structed by the Court through language and framing serve to reinforce ste-
reotypes about women. These narratives that devalue the woman's
judgment and define her as mother both reflect and advance political ele-
ments of the debate on abortion. Parties on both sides of the debate look to
the Court for signals on how the Court might rule in future cases. These
perceived signals, accurate or not, may significantly govern subsequent po-
litical action.
The generation and reinforcement of stigma has been a significant
issue in the Court's analysis of equal protection. The decision in Brown v.
Board of Education rested largely on the Court's conclusion that racially
segregated schools stigmatized black children.2 5 7 Gender discrimination
cases tend to focus on whether gender-based government action is the result
of archaic stereotyping of women. 258 But the Court has refused to consider
regulation of abortion or pregnancy as triggering gender discrimination. 259
Casey acknowledged that stereotyping of women, particularly the woman as
mother stereotype, was integrally related to abortion restrictions yet re-
frained from any formal analysis of gender discrimination. 26 0 The opinions
of Justices Stevens and Blackmun in Casey urged the Court to consider the
gender discrimination aspects of abortion regulation, as did the opinion of
Justice Ginsberg in Carhart II, but the Court showed no inclination to
move in that direction.
What the Court should address, independent of equal protection anal-
ysis, is whether laws that restrict abortion stigmatize women. As long as the
right to choose abortion is a constitutionally protected activity, the Court
should view with suspicion abortion regulations that stigmatize women.
Casey laid the groundwork for the increasing stigmatization of abortion by
expanding state authority to protect prenatal life throughout the pregnancy.
This authority allows the state to "persuade" the woman to choose child-
birth over abortion as long as it does not "coerce" her. This mythical dis-
tinction in fact operates by shaming. The state may not directly coerce the
257. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
258. U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996).
259. See, for example, the Court's infamous decision in Geduldig v Aiello, rejecting the
argument that classifications based on pregnancy were gender-based classifications.
Geduldig v Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1974).
260. Casey, 505 U.S. at 896-97.
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woman but it has the Court's blessing to shame her into a different deci-
sion. Casey creates a constitutional anomaly; the right to choose is constitu-
tionally protected but the state is given the green light to discourage the
exercise of that right through all means other than coercion. Other regula-
tions mentioned throughout this article, such as mandatory ultrasounds and
intrusive informed consent requirements, also have the purpose of shaming
and stigmatizing a woman who decides to terminate her pregnancy. The
Casey standard requires the Court to invalidate laws that by purpose or effect
constitute an undue burden on the right to choose. Abortion regulations
designed to stigmatize women pose a "substantial obstacle" to choice and
thus constitute an undue burden.261 Casey should be used to invalidate laws
that stigmatize women.
The Court also should turn a critical eye to its use of language and
framing. The Court's abortion decisions do not address the role of abortion
stigma. Nor are they sensitive to how the Court may be generating and
reinforcing abortion stigma through language and framing. The Court
should not be in the business of reproducing negative attitudes toward
women who are exercising a constitutional right. That it finds itself in this
situation is due in large part to the Court's unwillingness, since Roe, to
address deeply entrenched stereotypes about women and reproduction. Un-
less the Court is willing to confront how substantially these stereotypes im-
pact abortion laws and lead to the generation of abortion stigma, it will
continue to write decisions that employ the language and framing discourse
of abortion stigma.
CONCLUSION
The Court's ambivalence about abortion is reflected in its willingness
to uphold burdensome restrictions on access to the procedure. But this am-
bivalence also finds pervasive expression in the Court's increasing inclina-
tion to stigmatize abortion and the women who seek abortion. The Court's
abortion decisions are closely examined by all sides of the abortion contro-
versy for insights on how the Court is likely to resolve the next round of
litigation. Its reinforcement of abortion stigma, intended or not, contributes
to the political hostility towards women who decide, for whatever reason, to
terminate a pregnancy. Abortion stigma should be a concern for the Court,
for its gendered judgment of women and for the burden it places on women
who seek to exercise their constitutional rights. t
261. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877-78.
2013] 337

